

Overseas Influence Operations of the Chinese Communist Party: Furthering the Crackdown on Falun Gong in the United States

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I. Background and Summary

The Chinese Communist Party's ("CCP") influence operations around the world are well-established. CCP documents and other evidence detail common tactics used as well as the responsible agencies, entities, and officials. One important element of CCP's overseas initiatives involves furthering the violent persecutory campaign against Falun Gong practitioners, especially in the United States where Falun Gong is active.

This report details available evidence on the primary agencies and officials involved in efforts to further the crackdown on Falun Gong overseas. The primary entity responsible for directing, coordinating, and guiding anti-Falun Gong efforts is an extrajudicial security apparatus called the 6-10 Office. Other entities involved likely include the United Front Work Department and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council. Part II describes the origins, purposes, and activities of the 6-10 Office and its connection to anti-Falun Gong activities in New York. Part III does the same with respect to the other entities.

There is substantial evidence linking a New York non-profit called the Chinese Anti-Cult World Alliance (CACWA) to these CCP efforts. CACWA's two leaders both claim connections to CCP officials or entities. And CACWA engages in parallel conduct consistent with the directions of CCP and 6-10 Office officials, including distributing propaganda copied in substantial part from CCP sources; has been recognized by CCP and CCP-affiliated sources for its work against Falun Gong; and CACWA affiliates have claimed to have connections with Chinese officials in connection with their anti-Falun Gong activities.

II. The 6-10 Office: An Extrajudicial Security Apparatus Established by the CCP to Further the Persecution of Falun Gong

The 6-10 Office is the primary body responsible for implementing the CCP's violent crackdown on Falun Gong practitioners. It does so by coordinating the promulgation of dehumanizing propaganda labelling Falun Gong as enemies of the state, investigating and apprehending practitioners, and using arbitrary detention, torture, and other means to disrupt Falun Gong activities and to attempt to ideologically convert practitioners. As an instrument of the CCP, it operates beyond the law, but it also influences state actors and organizes and directs citizen associations to achieve its goals. Importantly, the 6-10 Office and CCP officials have been clear that an urgent goal is combatting Falun Gong in places where they are active abroad,

and they deploy similar tactics to do so in countries around the world, including the United States.

Part A details the crackdown on Falun Gong and the origins, purposes, and tactics of the 6-10 Office. Part B describes how the 6-10 Office and the CCP use local associations to further the crackdown. And Part C describes the evidence that the CCP and the 6-10 Office are working to project the crackdown on Falun Gong outside China, using a nonprofit association organized in New York as a case study.

A. Origins, Purposes, and Activities

In June 1999, then-Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Luo Gan, a member of the CCP Politburo, created the 6-10 Office to carry out a crackdown on Falun Gong.¹ The 6-10 Office “organiz[es] and lead[s] the struggle against Falun Gong;” carries out investigations and gathers intelligence on Falun Gong practitioners and their activities; and organizes and coordinates “the prevention, control, and punishment of Falun Gong.”² It is a creature of the CCP and not formally a part of the state: this status as an extrajudicial security apparatus exempts the Office from certain legal restrictions.³ Nonetheless, the 6-10 Office exercises control over state agencies, as its primary role is to coordinate “personnel at state institutions to assist in” carrying out the persecution of Falun Gong and it does so through influencing the conduct of judges and security officials among others.⁴

The 6-10 Office’s mission — the crackdown on Falun Gong — is part of a trend whereby the CCP has historically carried out persecutory campaigns against disfavored groups that have been perceived to threaten the CCP’s power. These campaigns are referred to with the specialized term of art “douzheng,” which deems its target as an “existential threat against whom extreme or extralegal measures are appropriate.”⁵ Following the initial identification of the “enemy target,” the CCP, party media, and affiliates disseminate propaganda to identify the target as an enemy of society. Ultimately, security forces mobilize to identify, detain, and physically and mentally abuse the targets to ideologically convert (“zhuanhua”) them.⁶ Since the 1950s, the CCP has carried out the douzheng of rightists and individuals involved in the Tiananmen movement among others.⁷

Structurally, the 6-10 Office has a centralized leadership that is closely linked to the highest echelons of the CCP and a network of branches throughout China. The CCP has a leading group of senior party officials dedicated to “Preventing and Handling the Problem of Heretical Organizations” (renamed from “The Leading Small Group for Handling the Falun

¹ Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report: 2008 at 87 (2008), <https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/2008%20CECC%20Annual%20Report.PDF> [hereinafter CECC 2008 Report].

² *Id.* at 89.

³ *See, e.g.*, Sarah Cook & Leeshai Lemish, *The 610 Office: Policing the Chinese Spirit*, 11 *China Brief* 6, 6 (2011).

⁴ *See id.* at 7.

⁵ Expert Report of Ryan Mitchell ¶ 1, available at Exhibit 34 of ECF No. 115-4, *Zhang Jingrong v. Chinese Anti-Cult World Alliance, Inc.*, Case No. 1:15-cv-01046 (E.D.N.Y.).

⁶ *See id.* ¶¶ 1–2.

⁷ *See id.* ¶ 1.

Gong Issue”).⁸ A former 6-10 Office official claimed that the 6-10 Office receives orders from this top echelon of senior party officials.⁹ 6-10 branch offices also exist throughout China, with branches in major Chinese cities as well as smaller cities and districts.¹⁰

Self-descriptions by local 6-10 Office branches establish key activities designed to further the crackdown on Falun Gong. One branch identified five tasks: (1) disseminating information regarding the ban on Falun Gong; (2) comprehensively administrating this policy; (3) utilizing legal tools to punish Falun Gong practitioners; (4) transforming Falun Gong practitioners through reeducation; and (5) preventing and lessening the conditions whereby cults can flourish.¹¹ 6-10 Office branches aggressively surveil Falun Gong practitioners, conducting home visits and conducting 24-hour surveillance of certain targets.¹² In addition to facilitating arbitrary detention of practitioners, 6-10 Office branches also directly operate a series of “reeducation through labor” camps to carry out the ideological conversion of practitioners.¹³ The officials at these camps routinely use torture methods such as solitary confinement and in some instances, officials have reportedly killed practitioners.¹⁴

As part of its efforts to influence the public’s opinion on Falun Gong and cast practitioners as enemies of the state, CCP leaders and the 6-10 Office have used an internet publication titled *Kaiwind* (www.kaiwind.com). While the precise management of *Kaiwind* is unclear, substantial evidence indicates it is managed and operated by CCP leadership and the 6-10 Office. For example, *Kaiwind* has been described as an instrument of “Party Central,”¹⁵ and local CCP branches have touted their involvement in facilitating participation in and composing articles for the website.¹⁶ Other local CCP groups have described *Kaiwind* as “led and organized” by the 6-10 Office or various alternative names for the organization.¹⁷

B. Coordinating Local Anti-Cult Associations

The 6-10 Office also coordinates anti-cult associations to supplement its direct efforts to crackdown on Falun Gong. These local associations are often formally organized as non-profits — for example, the Beijing-based China Anti-Cult association asserts it was “voluntarily

⁸ Cook & Lemish, *supra* note 3, at 6.

⁹ *See id.* at 7.

¹⁰ *See id.*

¹¹ CECC 2008 Report, *supra* note 1, at 89.

¹² *See id.*

¹³ *See id.* at 90.

¹⁴ *See id.*

¹⁵ Editorial Committee of the Local Gazetteer of Jiangxia District, Wuhan Municipality, “Jiangxia Yearbook 2009” [2009 江夏年鉴] 2009. p. 307.

¹⁶ *See, e.g.*, Communist Party Research Office of the Panjin Municipality Communist Party Committee, “Chinese Communist Party Panjin Municipality Law Enforcement Records of 2011” [中国共产党盘锦执政实录 2011] 2011. p. 122; Guo Shuhong et. al, “Hebi Municipality Party History Yearbook 2011” [鹤壁市党史年编 2011] Communist Party Research Office of the Hebi Municipality Communist Party Committee. 2012. p. 47.

¹⁷ The reference was later deleted but can be found via a Google search: <https://archive.is/5CRMt>; *see also* Nanping Municipal People’s Political Consultative Conference, “Introduction to Shanzhong Diwang,” [《山中帝王师—朱子》简介], September 30, 2015. <https://archive.is/6N0AN>; 610 Office of Shangri-La Town, “Shangri-LaTown Participates in the Whole-Province Anti-Cult Online Propaganda Work Training,” [香格里拉市参加全州反邪教网宣工作培训] November 25, 2015. <https://archive.is/RBiin>.

formed” and is registered as an “non-profit, social welfare organization.”¹⁸ They disseminate anti-Falun Gong propaganda and hold study sessions and other activities to raise “anti-cult awareness.”¹⁹

One prominent association founded in 2000 is named the China Anti-Cult Association (“CACA”). According to CACA’s bylaws, one of CACA’s purposes is to further the “douzheng” of evil cult organizations.²⁰ As will be discussed in more detail in the following section, CACA also aims to “[s]trengthen relations with similar organizations overseas.”²¹ There is substantial evidence that these purportedly independent associations act at the direction and under the supervision of the 6-10 Office and CCP leadership. For example, one anti-cult association in Guizhou province “admitted . . . it was founded ‘under the leadership of the Party and government.’”²² Another local association described how it worked in partnership with the 6-10 Office to implement anti-cult educational programs at local schools.²³

C. Overseas Activities

The 6-10 Office, along with the anti-cult associations it coordinates, has made it a priority to spread the crackdown on Falun Gong overseas, particularly in areas where Falun Gong are active. Mirroring the tactics used in China, the 6-10 Office facilitates and directs international off-shoots of CACAs to spread anti-Falun Gong communications, gather intelligence, and interfere with Falun Gong activities.

CCP leaders involved in the 6-10 Office and other officials have directed overseas activity targeting Falun Gong. For example,

- In December 2015, high-level CCP leader Meng Jianzhu spoke to central 6-10 Office officials at a meeting, arguing that “Western anti-China forces have used ‘Falun Gong’ . . . as an important tool for denigrating and attacking” the CCP and that this activity represents a threat to national security. As a result, Meng advocated for treating “the countries and regions with serious ‘Falun Gong’ activities such as the United States as the main battlefield,” using “all means in an integrated manner to maximize the pressure on cult organizations’ overseas activity spaces.” These means included intelligence collection, “crackdown control, and education transformation.” Meng called for strengthening the weak link of overseas struggle against Falun Gong.²⁴
- A 2017 publication of a local CCP committee called for “[i]n-depth investigations of overseas key cult members . . . [and establishing] an effective management and

¹⁸ CECC 2008 Report, *supra* note 1, at 91.

¹⁹ *See id.* at 91.

²⁰ Bylaws of the Chinese Anti-Cult Association § 6(1), available as ECF No. 115-4 in *Zhang Jingrong v. Chinese Anti-Cult World Alliance*, Case No. 1:15-cv-01046 (E.D.N.Y.).

²¹ *See id.* § 6(5).

²² CECC 2008 Report, *supra* note 1, at 91.

²³ *See id.*

²⁴ Human Rights Law Foundation, CCP’s Directives on Extending the Persecution of Falun Gong to Western Countries (Feb. 19, 2022), <https://hrllf.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/CCP-Directives-2015-2018-1.pdf>.

control mechanism,” including blacklisting participants. As part of these efforts, the CCP committee advocated collecting “early-warning, forward-looking, action-oriented intelligence information” on key figures overseas and their organizations. To achieve this end, the committee sought to cultivate non-governmental forces to fight Falun Gong, mobilize friendly Chinese citizens overseas, and honor “the positive role of overseas economic entities such as overseas businesses” in the anti-Falun Gong struggle abroad.²⁵

- The director of a 6-10 Office branch in Xianyang urged rallying all available resources to strengthen the overseas struggle against Falun Gong. In particular, the director called on the use of friendship cities, leadership visits by foreign affairs departments, and overseas businesses to organize propaganda and harm Falun Gong.²⁶

CCP officials and the 6-10 Office work together to make funding sources available to overseas individuals and entities that aid in the crackdown on Falun Gong. As one local CCP publication explained, “overseas nongovernmental anti-cult organizations require large amounts of support, most important of which is funding.”²⁷ Because direct party or government funding would create controversies, the publication instead advocating using overseas commercial enterprises to fund and support nongovernmental organization dedicated to the crackdown on Falun Gong.²⁸

A prominent example of the extension of the crackdown on Falun Gong into the United States is the Chinese Anti-Cult World Alliance, Inc. (“CACWA”). As the late federal judge Jack Weinstein noted, CACWA is “an international offshoot of CACA.”²⁹ Founded in September 2008, CACWA is a not-for-profit corporation registered under the laws of New York with the purpose of “educat[ing] society about the dangers of the Falun gong cult and its anti-human and anti-society practices.”³⁰ Since its founding, two individuals — Li Huahong and Michael Chu (also known as Zhu Li Chuang) — have directed CACWA’s operations. Ms. Li held herself out as the Chairperson of CACWA and Mr. Chu held himself out as the Council Chairperson.³¹

Paralleling the activities of the 6-10 Office and CACAs in China, CACWA engages in several activities in the United States. CACWA publishes a newsletter with anti-Falun Gong commentary called the “Shitou” Newsletter, which it distributes on the streets in Flushing, Queens.³² These newsletters call for the violent suppression of Falun Gong and characterize

²⁵ *See id.*

²⁶ *See id.*

²⁷ Declaration of Dr. Can Sun ¶ 9 (translating “Supporting Overseas Chinese to Establish and Develop Grassroots Anti-Evil Cult Organizations Is the Best Avenue to Combat the Overseas Evil-Cult”), available as ECF 115-4 in *Zhang Jingrong v. Chinese Anti-Cult World Alliance*, Case No. 1:15-cv-01046 (E.D.N.Y.).

²⁸ *See id.*

²⁹ *Zhang Jingrong v. Chinese Anti-Cult World All., Inc.*, 311 F. Supp. 3d 514, 532 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), *rev’d on other grounds*, 16 F.4th 47 (2d Cir. 2021).

³⁰ Certificate of Incorporation of Chinese Anti-Cult World Alliance Inc. filed with the New York State Department, dated September 18, 2008.

³¹ Business Cards of Li Huahong and Michael Chu, available as Ex. 39, ECF No. 115-4 in *Zhang Jingrong v. Chinese Anti-Cult World Alliance, Inc.*, Case No. 1:15-cv-01046 (E.D.N.Y.).

³² *Zhang Jingrong*, 311 F. Supp. 3d at 532.

Falun Gong practitioners as “malignant tumors,” “the scum of humanity,” among other subhuman descriptions.³³ CACWA’s chairpersons and affiliates have also been implicated in numerous instances of violence, death threats, and property destruction targeting Falun Gong practitioners in Queens.³⁴

There is strong evidence that CACWA operates at the direction and/or in coordination with CCP officials, the 6-10 Office, and/or CACAs in China. First, the CACWA newsletter produced by Mr. Chu and Ms. Li reproduces languages from *Kaiwind*, which, as discussed above, is linked to CCP and 6-10 Office personnel.³⁵ Furthermore, there is reason to believe that Ms. Li and/or Mr. Chu communicate with *Kaiwind* to publicize their anti-Falun Gong efforts. For example, Ms. Li allegedly orchestrated an attack on a person she mistakenly believed was a Falun Gong leader, ultimately causing the police to arrest him. A photograph of his arrest was then published on the *Kaiwind* website.³⁶

Second, CCP and 6-10 Office-affiliated entities and officials have recognized CACWA for its work in furthering the crackdown on Falun Gong. Around 2012, for example, a deputy of Zhou Yongkang, a senior CCP and 6-10 Office official, reportedly provided Li Huahong with an award for her anti-Falun Gong activities at a ceremony in the United States.³⁷ Articles published on *Kaiwind* have also praised CACWA for its anti-Falun Gong activities in New York.³⁸

Third, in harassing practitioners and interfering with Falun Gong activities in Flushing, Ms. Li has touted her apparent connections with Chinese officials. In September 2011, Ms. Li approached a table in Flushing where Falun Gong practitioners were stationed to hand out pamphlets and other materials. Ms. Li then told the Falun Gong practitioners that she had photographs of them, that they are on a blacklist with the Chinese Ambassador, and that they would be executed if they returned to China.³⁹ Ms. Li made nearly identical assertions to other Falun Gong practitioners on multiple occasions.⁴⁰

³³ See *id.* at 532; see also Excerpts from the CACWA Shitou Newsletter, available at ECF No. 106-5 in *Zhang Jingrong v. Chinese Anti-Cult World Alliance, Inc.*, Case No. 1:15-cv-01046 (E.D.N.Y.).

³⁴ See *Zhang Jingrong*, 311 F. Supp. 3d at 533–534.

³⁵ See Excerpts from the CACWA Shitou Newsletter, available at ECF No. 106-5 in *Zhang Jingrong v. Chinese Anti-Cult World Alliance, Inc.*, Case No. 1:15-cv-01046 (E.D.N.Y.).

³⁶ Decl. of [Bian Hexiang] ¶ 12, available as Ex. 22, ECF No. 115-3 in *Zhang Jingrong v. Chinese Anti-Cult World Alliance, Inc.*, Case No. 1:15-cv-01046 (E.D.N.Y.).

³⁷ See Brad Hamilton, Chinalink to Liu, N.Y. Post (May 13, 2012), <https://nypost.com/2012/05/13/chinalink-to-liu/#ixzz1upqdbPXi>; 【独家】周永康制造法拉盛事件 美国追捕周的副手, Epoch Times (Apr. 26, 2012), <https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/12/4/26/n3574770.htm>.

³⁸ See 2011年, 法轮功千疮百孔, *Kaiwind* (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.kaiwind.com/redian/pd2011/201112/07/t20111207_864028.htm (copy on file with Human Rights Law Foundation).

³⁹ Dep. of Zhou Yanhua 190–93 in *Zhang Jingrong v. Chinese Anti-Cult World Alliance, Inc.*, Case No. 1:15-cv-01046 (E.D.N.Y.).

⁴⁰ See, e.g., Dep. of Cui Lina 60–61, in *Zhang Jingrong v. Chinese Anti-Cult World Alliance, Inc.*, Case No. 1:15-cv-01046 (E.D.N.Y.).

CACWA's funding sources are opaque. While Li Huahong claimed she directly funds some of CACWA's activities, she also suggested that a family member would send her money which she used for CACWA activities.⁴¹

III. Other Chinese Entities Projecting Chinese Influence Abroad

A. United Front Work Department

Another of the CCP's primary tools to manage populations in China and abroad is the United Front Work Department (UFWD). The UFWD deploys a range of tools to encourage or entice individuals and entities to support the CCP's policy priorities. In recent years, the CCP has emphasized the need to increase its overseas work. While the extent to which UFWD directs actions against Falun Gong in the United States is unclear, there is some overlap between individuals involved in UFWD activities and the 6-10 Office and CCP activities discussed above.

The united front strategy is formulated at the senior levels of the CCP, including by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. The UFWD is then tasked with implementing the strategy. It has four subordinate offices (General Office, Party Committee, Policy Research Office, and Retired Cadres Office) and nine specialized bureaus (ranging from an ethnic and religious work bureau to an overseas liaison bureau).⁴² The UFWD operates through its own officials as well as by guiding and funding linked entities, such as local associations of individuals of Chinese dissent, Chinese student groups, and research institutes.⁴³ In 2018, the UFWD absorbed a number of state entities that were previously independent, including the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, which will be discussed in more detail below.⁴⁴

Relevant here, the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification (CPPRC) is subordinate to UFWD.⁴⁵ The CPPRC is one of the most prominent instruments mobilizing individuals of Chinese dissent in support of Beijing policies, including the reunification of China and Taiwan.⁴⁶ CPRCC has 200 chapters in 90 countries, including 33 in the United States (typically under the name "Association for China's Peaceful Unification").⁴⁷ In October 2020, then-Secretary of State Michael Pompeo announced that the State Department was designating the U.S. parent organization — the National Association for China's Peaceful Unification — a foreign mission of the People's Republic of China.⁴⁸

⁴¹ See, e.g., Li Huahong Dep. 175–76 (Oct. 14, 2016), in *Zhang Jingrong v. Chinese Anti-Cult World Alliance, Inc.*, Case No. 1:15-cv-01046 (E.D.N.Y.).

⁴² The others include a party work bureau, a cadre bureau, an economics bureau, an independent and non-party intellectuals work bureau, a Tibet bureau, a new social class representatives work bureau, and a Xinjiang bureau. See Alexander Bowe, U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission, *China's Overseas United Front Work: Background and Implications for the United States* 4–5 (2018).

⁴³ See *id.* at 7–18.

⁴⁴ See *id.* at 7.

⁴⁵ See *id.* at 8.

⁴⁶ See *id.* at 8–9.

⁴⁷ See *id.* at 8.

⁴⁸ Press Release, Designation of the National Association for China's Peaceful Unification (NACPU) as a Foreign Mission of the PRC, Oct. 28, 2020, <https://2017-2021.state.gov/designation-of-the-national-association-for-chinas-peaceful-unification-nacpu-as-a-foreign-mission-of-the-prc/index.html>.

While the relationship between the UFDW and CCP efforts to further the crackdown on Falun Gong in the United States are unclear, there is overlap between individuals involved in both endeavors. For example, Michael Chu, the co-chairperson of CACWA, has held positions in entities and groups connected to UFDW. Mr. Chu held himself out as the Vice President of the New York Association for Peaceful Unification of China, a chapter of the CPPRC, which is directly subordinate to UFDW.⁴⁹ And as will be detailed more below, Mr. Chu also held himself out as the Director of the China Overseas Exchange Association (COEA).⁵⁰ Affiliation with these entities raises the possibility that UFDW and/or other CCP officials influence, direct, guide, or fund Mr. Chu's anti-Falun Gong work in New York.

B. Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council (OCAO)

While subordinate to the UFDW since 2018, OCAO formerly operated under the State Council as a separate tool of influence, persuasion, and manipulation of individuals of Chinese descent living outside the country.

OCAO uses “people-to-people methods” and a “systematic approach of persuasion, influence, and manipulation” to guide and direct members of the overseas Chinese community. As a leading expert writes, “[n]o other government initiative can match [the CCP's overseas efforts'] scale of operation or sophistication, nor profess to reach the level of success that China has enjoyed under a wide variety of specialist programmes and activities.”⁵¹

As a tool of social control, overseas work aims to “gain and secure the loyalty of the overseas Chinese community,” and then mobilize strategic diaspora groups for the Party's political goals. Much of this work is not done overtly or using coercive or interventionist means. Instead, it is carried out via incentives, disincentives, alliance building, marginalization, propaganda, psychological persuasion, and “win-win” benefits for all involved. For example, in 2006, the OCAO director met with a delegation of overseas Chinese visiting from Chicago and praised them for their contributions in the struggle against Falun Gong.⁵²

One of the objectives of the OCAO is to mobilize members of the overseas Chinese community to “struggle” against the party's perceived enemies, including through intimidation, coercion, and propaganda. OCAO has long focused on the struggle against Falun Gong. In 2001, for example, the OCAO director called on “marshalling OCAO resources to ‘unite all powers that can be united . . . make them understand and support the Chinese government's position and policy of handling the ‘Falun Gong’ problem according to the law.’”⁵³ The director urged “striking against” overseas Falun Gong activity centers, and a 2007 OCAO report noted that OCAO was coordinating “the launching of anti ‘Falun Gong’ struggles overseas by relevant

⁴⁹ Business Cards of Li Huahong and Michael Chu, available as Ex. 39, ECF No. 115-4 in *Zhang Jingrong v. Chinese Anti-Cult World Alliance, Inc.*, Case No. 1:15-cv-01046 (E.D.N.Y.).

⁵⁰ *See id.*

⁵¹ To, James Jiann Hua, *Qiaowu: Extra-territorial Policies for the Overseas Chinese* 4 (Brill 2014).

⁵² CECC 2008 Annual Report, *supra* note 1, at 93.

⁵³ *See id.* at 92.

departments.”⁵⁴ This anti-Falun Gong activity was to be seamlessly intertwined with other CCP policy priorities, including anti-Taiwanese independence activities.⁵⁵

While concrete connections between OCAO and anti-Falun Gong activity carried out in New York are unclear, there is overlap between individuals involved in both endeavors. As discussed above, Michael Chu, the co-chairperson of CACWA, held himself out as a director of the China Overseas Exchange Association (COEA). This is the same name of a national nonprofit founded in China in the 1990s under the control of OCAO.⁵⁶ Mr. Chu also stated that he travelled to China to attend a banquet hosted by OCAO, among others.⁵⁷ Affiliation with OCAO, which has long focused on spreading the crackdown on Falun Gong overseas, raises the possibility that OCAO and/or other CCP officials influenced, directed, guided, or funded Mr. Chu’s anti-Falun Gong work in New York.

⁵⁴ *Id.*

⁵⁵ *See id.*

⁵⁶ *See, e.g.*, Overseas Affairs Office of the State Council, 中国海外交流协会章程 (accessed Sept. 7, 2022), <http://www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2009/0423/1/13675.shtml>; 中国海外交流协会, Baidu (accessed Sept. 7, 2022), <https://baike.baidu.com/item/中国海外交流协会>.

⁵⁷ Dep. of Michael Chu 110–13, in in *Zhang Jingrong v. Chinese Anti-Cult World Alliance, Inc.*, Case No. 1:15-cv-01046 (E.D.N.Y.).